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Issues in the Third Circuit
DEATH AND TAXES: THE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND ITS
USE IN ESTATE PLANNING AFTER THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
RULING IN ESTATE OF THOMPSON V. COMMISSIONER
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, courts have increasingly scrutinized the use of the
family limited partnership ("FLP") as an estate-planning device.' While
most limited partnerships are formed primarily for business purposes, the
formation of an FLP is often motivated by the client's desire to relieve the
burden of the federal estate tax.2 An FLP is a family operated limited
partnership that enables the taxpayer to reduce the size of his or her taxa-
ble estate. 3 The technique for deriving this tax benefit is simple: a tax-
payer forms an FLP with family members and contributes assets to the
FLP. 4 In exchange for this contribution, the taxpayer receives a limited
1. See generally Brett R. Bissonette, Getting It Right: Avoiding the Seven Deadly Sins
in the Formation and Management of the Family Limited Partnership, 30 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 59 (2004) (summarizing relevant litigation concerning legitimacy of use of
FLPs as means of estate planning).
2. See DAVID T. LEWIS & ANDREA C. CHOMAKOS, THE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIP DESKBOOK FORMING AND FUNDING FLPs AND OTHER CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS
ENTITIES 3 (2004) (arguing that "use of an FLP may offer the best alternative in
terms of flexibility and in satisfying a majority of the client's objectives"); Travis L.
Bowen & Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use in Tax, Estate and Business Plan-
ning, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 306 (1996) (describing FLP as important vehicle for
achieving estate planning goals); Family Limited Partnerships, at http://www.usalaw.
com/family.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005) (characterizing FLP as "a preferred
structure for intrafamily gifting and ownership"); Pamela Savage Forbat, Family
Limited Partnerships (Mar. 1, 2000), at http://registeredrep.com/mag/finance-
family-limited-partnerships/index.html (describing FLPs as "the estate planning
tactic du jour") (internal quotations omitted). For a complete discussion of the
tax and non-tax goals achieved through the use of FLPs, see infra notes 37-68 and
accompanying text.
3. See Top TAX ISSUES FOR 2005 132 (George G. Jones et al. eds., 2005) [here-
inafter Top TAX ISSUES] (providing definition of FLP); Bowen & Bailey, supra note
2, at 308 (delineating potential FLP members); Daniel H. Ruttenberg, Internal Rev-
enue Code Section 2036(a) and Its Application to Family Entities, at www.smolenplevy.
com/2036_paper.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) (reviewing estate tax advantages
accompanying family entities); see also Family Limited Partnerships, supra note 2 (not-
ing nine advantages of FLPs). For a complete discussion of the formation of an
FLP, see infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. For discussion of the tax bene-
fits of forming an FLP and use of an FLP to reduce federal estate taxes, see Bisson-
ette, supra note 1, at 59 and Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 140.
4. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 89, 96-98 (detailing process of con-
tributing assets to FLP). For further discussion of how assets are typically contrib-
uted to FLP, see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
(1183)
1
Bishow: Death and Taxes: The Family Limited Partnership and Its Use in Es
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
partnership interest in the FLP.5 Upon death, the taxpayer's gross estate
includes the value of the limited partnership interest instead of the value
of the transferred assets. 6 A non-controlling interest in a family entity is
worth very little on the open market; as such, the estate will apply substan-
tial valuation discounts to the taxable value of the FLP interests, thereby
reducing the amount of tax owed at the taxpayer's death. 7
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) argues that discount valuations
are abusive in this context because many FLPs are nothing more than tax
shelters for affluent taxpayers. 8 As a result, the IRS has fought vigilantly to
curtail this abuse by including the entire value of the assets transferred to
the FLP in the decedent's gross estate under Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) Section 2036(a). 9 Section 2036(a) includes all property transferred
during the decedent's lifetime in the decedent's gross estate when the de-
cedent failed to abdicate enjoyment of or control over the assets subse-
quent to the transfer.10
Courts have increasingly favored the IRS's argument in cases where it
is clear that a decedent's transfers to an FLP were illusory.1 1 Although
5. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 131-32 (discussing formation of FLP
through contribution of assets).
6. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 140 (noting that estate tax applies to
value of partnership interest, not contributed assets).
7. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (explaining rational behind
lack of control discount for FLP interests); see also Bissonette, supra note 1, at 59
(noting use of family limited partnerships as means of "obtaining a valuation dis-
count for their clients' estates in order to ultimately reduce the estate tax to be
paid at death").
8. See Terry Eyberg & Barbara J. Raasch, FLP Planning After Strangi, Kimbell
and Thompson, TAX ADVISER, Dec. 2004, at 750 (noting that IRS "litigates FLP
cases it perceives as being highly abusive"); Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 2 (stating
that "IRS has found many of these claimed valuation discounts abusive").
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (2004). To read the statute in its entirety, see infra
note 71 (providing text of Section 2036(a)).
10. See Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 750 (providing brief overview of
retained interest argument under Section 2036(a)). For a summary of cases ad-
dressing retained interest under Section 2036(a), see infra notes 74-87 and accom-
panying text. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's interpretation of retained
interest under Section 2036(a), see infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
11. See Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 (2002) (holding
Section 2036(a) included assets transferred to FLP in gross estate on grounds that
donor/decedent retained lifetime enjoyment of assets and FLP offered no non-tax
advantages); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi 1), 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part and rem'd in part, (Strangi I1), 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (apply-
ing Section 2036(a) in absence of non-tax benefit from transfer); Estate of
Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000) (holding same as Harper); Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997) (holding same); cf Es-
tate of Kimbell v. Comm'r, 371 F.3d 257, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding Section
2036(a) did not include transferred assets in decedent's gross estate where dece-
dent relinquished sufficient control over assets); Estate of Church v. United States,
85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-804, 2000-1 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding Section 2036(a)
did not apply in absence of finding that donor/decedent retained right to control
or enjoyment of transferred assets). For a discussion of the reasoning behind
Church's refusal to apply Section 2036(a) to a transfer made to an FLP, see infra
1184 [Vol. 50: p. 1183
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transfers to most limited partnerships involve legitimate business objec-
tives, estate-planning goals motivate many FLP related transfers. 12 When
tax advantages motivate a transaction and the donor retains an interest in
the transferred property, the courts categorically refuse to include dis-
counted FLP interests in the decedent's gross estate, choosing instead to
include the full value of the transferred assets.13
The IRS's Section 2036(a) argument won a recent victory in Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner,14 a case of first impression for the Third Cir-
cuit.15 Although the Third Circuit considered Section 2036(a) in other
contexts, it never squarely addressed whether Section 2036(a) applied to
assets transferred to an FLP prior to Thompson.' 6 This Casebrief considers
the Third Circuit's interpretation of Section 2036(a) in Thompson. 7 First,
Part II explains the procedure for forming an FLP.1 8 Part III then consid-
ers the tax and non-tax benefits of forming an FLP.19 Part IV discusses
prior litigation against FLPs and considers the Tax Court and the Fifth
Circuit's conflicting interpretations of Section 2036(a). 20 Part V discusses
the facts in Thompson and summarizes the Third Circuit's analysis, with
particular emphasis on its interpretation of the bona fide sale exception to
notes 177-81 and accompanying text (providing argument against appropriateness
of Section 2036(a) in context of transfers made pursuant to formation of FLP).
12. For further discussion of the IRS's argument, see supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text and infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing IRS's
preference to include value of assets transferred to FLP in decedent's gross estate
under Section 2036(a)).
13. For a further discussion of valuation discounts, see infra notes 43-59 and
accompanying text (discussing court's refusal to include discounted FLP interests
in gross estates).
14. 382 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2004).
15. See R. Milton Howell, III, Lessons of Thompson and Kimbell, TAx ADViSER,
Dec. 2004, at 733 (noting "the Third Circuit presented the Service with a major
victory in its ongoing war on family limited partnerships").
16. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 369 (considering application of Section 2036(a)
to assets transferred to FLP). The only Third Circuit case addressing the applica-
tion of Section 2036(a) to assets transferred to a family entity is Estate of D'Ambrosio
v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996). In DAmbrosio, the court held
that assets transferred by the decedent to a family-owned corporation were in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate under Section 2036(a). See id. (stating
holding).
17. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's reasoning and the factors that influ-
enced its application of Section 2036(a), see infra notes 135-63 and accompanying
text.
18. For an explanation of how to form an FLP, see infra notes 25-36 and ac-
companying text.
19. For an overview of the tax benefits of an FLP, see infra notes 41-59 and
accompanying text. For an overview of the non-tax advantages of an FLP, see infra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
20. For a narrative of prior litigation against FLPs, see infra notes 69-112 and
accompanying text (considering precedent for application of Section 2036(a) to
assets transferred to FLP). For a discussion of conflicting interpretations of Sec-
tion 2036(a)'s bona fide sales exception between the Tax Court and Circuit
Courts, see infra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
2005] CASEBRIEF 1185
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Section 2036(a). 21 Part VI offers a critique of the application of Section
2036(a) to FLP transfers.2 2 Finally, Part VII provides a guide for practi-
tioners to follow when forming an FLP in light of Thompson.2 3 Overall,
this Casebrief argues that, despite the Third Circuit's strict interpretation
of Section 2036(a), the FLP is still an effective estate-planning device when
formed for a legitimate business purpose and operated in accordance with
the guidelines set forth in Thompson.
24
II. FORMING AN FLP
An FLP is a limited partnership formed by members of a family.
25
Like all partnerships, FLPs are formed pursuant to state partnership law.
26
There are three steps to forming an FLP: (1) determining partners; (2)
drafting a partnership agreement; and (3) funding the FLP. 27 First, the
prospective partners must determine which member(s) will act as general
partner(s) and which will act as limited partners. 28 As explained below, to
21. For a detailed analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in Thompson, see
infra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text (raising argument that Sec-
tion 2036(a) should not be applied in FLP cases on grounds that transfer of assets
to FLP is not type of transfer addressed in Section 2036(a)).
23. For a description of the criteria of a successfully formed and operated
FLP, see infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
24. For sources supporting the proposition that FLPs remain vital estate plan-
ning tools, see infra note 218.
25. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 308 (describing FLP as species of
partnership formed by family members). FLPs often span generations. See id. (dis-
cussing intergenerational nature of many family limited partnerships); see also infra
notes 52-54 (discussing relationship between restrictions on right to transfer inter-
ests and lack of marketability discounts).
26. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 308 (noting state law governs forma-
tion of family limited partnerships); see also LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at
100 (stating courts generally respect FLP properly formed under applicable state
law).
27. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 308-13 (discussing steps necessary to
form valid FLP).
28. See id. (characterizing delegation of authority among partners as prelimi-
nary concern for FLP formation); see also id. at 308-09 (emphasizing importance of
carefully selecting general partner). The distinction between a general partner
and a limited partner is primarily one of liability. See Louis A. Mezzullo, Family
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 812 TAX. MGMT. (BNA), at A-2
(2004) (recognizing general partner's liability for debts, obligations and liabilities
of limited partnership). To avoid exposing a family member to the liability of
general partnership, many families form a second business entity to serve as the
general partner. See Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 134 (noting that use of gen-
eral corporate partner can protect personal assets of individual members from
creditors); see also Mezzullo, supra, at A-2 (advocating use of entity as general part-
ner to limit liability of individuals). When a limited liability entity serves as general
partner, the partners only risk the capital contributed to the corporation or Lim-
ited Liability Company (LLC). See Jeffery J. Radowich, Family Limited Partnerships
and Other Estate Planning Techniques, in ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE OWNER OF A FAm-
ILY BUSINESS 286, 299 (1998), reprinted from FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, PBI Pub-
lication No. 1997-1353 (1997) (discussing use of corporation as general partner).
1186 [Vol. 50: p. 1183
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ensure the availability of certain valuation discounts, it is imperative that
the decedent acted as a limited partner during his or her lifetime. 29 Sec-
ond, the partners must draft a partnership agreement. 30 The partnership
agreement should clearly state the purpose of the partnership, the rights
and responsibilities of the partners and the allocation of profits and
losses. 3 1 Additionally, the partnership agreement should address the part-
ners' rights to transfer their partnership interests. 32 The third and final
step in forming an FLP is to fund the FLP, which generally occurs in one
of two ways. 33 First, the senior family member (usually the mother or fa-
ther) may transfer assets into the partnership in exchange for all of the
interests in the FLP.3 4 When using this method, the senior member then
gifts his or her limited partnership interest to younger family members.
3 5
Alternatively, each of the prospective partners may transfer assets into the
FLP in exchange for proportionate partnership interests.
3 6
29. For a discussion of the relationship between limited partner status and
availability of valuation discounts for lack of control, see infra notes 56-59 and ac-
companying text.
30. See Radowich, supra note 28, at 312 (commenting on partnership agree-
ment). Most states will recognize an oral partnership agreement, but authorities
recommend that the agreement be in written form. See, e.g., Top TAX IssuEs, supra
note 3, at 133 (recommending that partners draft written partnership agreement);
Radowich, supra note 28, at 297 (detailing aspects of written FLPs); see also Bowen
& Bailey, supra note 2, at 312 (highlighting advantages of written FLPs compared
with oral FLPs).
31. See Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 133 (summarizing typical terms of FLP
partnership agreement); see also LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 160-74 (pro-
viding two sample FLP partnership agreements); Mezzullo, supra note 28, at B-301-
14 (same).
32. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 133 (discussing transfer rights agree-
ment provision). "This provision on transfer rights is typically highly restrictive-
both to keep ownership within the family and to create discounts for lack of mar-
ketability ... in valuing the limited partnership interests for.., tax purposes." Id.
For a full discussion on the relationship between transfer rights restrictions and
valuation discounts, see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
33. See LEWIS & CHOMArOS, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing methods for fund-
ing FLPs). For a precise description of the criteria of a successfully formed and
operated FLP, see infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
34. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 89 (noting that "[m]ost FLPs are
formed by a husband and wife (the initial partners) contributing assets to the FLP
in exchange for all of the interests in the FLP"); see also Top TAX IssuEs, supra note
3, at 132 (discussing senior members contribution of assets in exchange for bulk of
partnerships interests).
35. See id. (describing gifting of partnership assets as method of transferring
wealth to next generation). For an overview of the gift tax, see BrrIKER ET AL.,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 51-207 (Aspen Bus. & Law 8th ed. 2000)
(1990).
36. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing partner contribu-
tions to FLP). Under these circumstances, "the other partners are contributing
assets of relatively nominal value in proportion to the value of the assets contrib-
uted by the initial partners." Id. This approach to funding the FLP allows younger
partners to "take[ ] advantage of the discounts applicable to the partnership valua-
tion and consolidated their investments with the family and the overall strategy of
gifting." Id.
1.1,8720051 GASEBRIEF
5
Bishow: Death and Taxes: The Family Limited Partnership and Its Use in Es
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VIovA LAW REvIEw
III. THE TAX AND NoN-TAx BENEFITS OF FORMING AN FLP
The FLP is one of many family-run business entities used to accom-
plish family planning goals.3 7 Forming an FLP provides significant tax ad-
vantages for its members by reducing the amount of estate taxes owed at
death. 38 In addition, forming an FLP offers a number of non-tax bene-
fits.3 9 As a result, the FLP is an effective vehicle for families with multiple
tax, business and estate planning objectives. 40
A. Tax Benefits
There are two ways in which forming an FLP reduces the taxable
value of the decedent's gross estate. 4 1 The first method is by gifting part-
nership interests to younger family members, thereby reducing "the do-
nor's gross estate by the amount of the gift."4 2 The second and more
37. See Mezzullo, supra note 28, at A-i (describing business entities commonly
used for estate planning). The first and most traditional alternative to the family
limited partnership is the trust. See id. (summarizing use of trust in estate plan-
ning). A second and increasingly popular entity used to accomplish family plan-
ning goals is the LLC. See id. (explaining structure of LLC). In fact, some
authorities consider the LLC to be superior to the FLP for family planning pur-
poses. See id. at A-3 (arguing LLC is most beneficial entity for estate planning); see
also LEwis & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 2 (suggesting structure of LLC is "simpler
and more advantageous in the estate planning context" than FLP). For a summary
of the structure of a LLC, see id. at 2 (discussing LLC); Mezzullo, supra note 28, at
A-1-3 (same).
38. See Bissonette, supra note 1, at 59-61 (discussing estate tax advantages of
FLP); Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 140 (illustrating how use of FLP might
decrease estate tax burden). For further discussion of the use of FLP interests to
reduce the estate tax paid at death, see infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
39. See LEwis & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing achievement of life-
time financial goals); Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 133 (noting FLPs provide "a
number of nontax benefits that suit the goals of the family irrespective of the sub-
stantial tax savings realized"); Mezzullo, supra note 28, at A-37-40 (describing busi-
ness reasons for FLP formation); see also Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 339-40
(discussing use of FLP to achieve business planning objectives). For examples of
FLP non-tax advantages, see infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
40. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 306 (noting FLP is important instru-
ment for "1) reducing... estate and other taxes, 2) preserving the family business,
3) satisfying desires regarding the disposition of property, and 4) protecting assets
from unnecessary liability exposure to creditors").
41. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 135 (considering tax benefits of FLP).
An FLP offers a number of tax benefits to its members, but many are extrinsic to
the dispute in Thompson. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 373 (3d
Cir. 2004) (discussing use of FLP interests to reduce decedent's federal estate tax).
Accordingly, this Casebrief focuses on the tax benefit disputed in Thompson-the
use of to reduce the taxable value of a decedent's gross estate. See id. (same). In
addition to reducing the estate tax, an FLP also offers gift tax and income tax
benefits. See Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 135-40 (noting numerous tax benefits
of FLP formation). For more information on these benefits, see id.
42. Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 6. The decedent's gross estate is further re-
duced by gifting because the income generated by the gifted asset is also excluded.
See id. (describing various methods for reducing gross estate through gifting). The
IRC also provides the taxpayer with annual gift tax exclusions. See id. at 6 n.9
1188 [Vol. 50: p. 1183
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contentious way that an FLP reduces the taxable value of a decedent's
gross estate is through the application of valuation discounts to his or her
taxable estate.
43
Valuation discounts reduce the taxable value of an asset.4 4 Valuation
discounts work to reduce the taxed owed on an FLP interest because "the
lack of a ready market for the interest and the inability of its owner to
assert control over management of the enterprise" diminishes the inter-
est's value.45 As a result, the two primary valuation discounts available to
FLP interests are the marketability discount and the lack of control dis-
count.46 These valuation discounts are premised on fair market value,
which is defined as "the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." 47 A limited partner in an FLP has neither the ability to transfer his
or her interests to a third party nor the right to participate in certain as-
pects of the FLP's management; accordingly, these factors substantially di-
minish the fair market value of the limited partner's interest in an FLP.
48
(discussing annual gift tax exclusion). In addition, the IRC provides a credit for
the gift taxes imposed on the first $1,000,000 gifted in excess of the donor's annual
exclusion. See id. (discussing cumulative lifetime credit).
43. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 11-19 (explaining valuation dis-
counts); Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 13941 (noting tax advantages); Mezzullo,
supra note 28, at A-8-1 4 (explaining valuation discounts); Valuation Discounts-Gifts
of Partial Interests or Units of Family Limited Partnerships or LLCs (Apr. 22, 2004), at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/pp/042004.htm [hereinafter
Valuation Discounts].
44. See Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 140 (noting use of FLP interests to
reduce decedent's gross estate). The following example demonstrates the effect of
valuation discounts on a decedent's gross estate:
[A]ssume a decedent's gross estate included a 70% interest in an FLP.
Further assume that the FLP owns assets with a fair market value of
$1,000,000. Without the discounting, the decedent's interest in the FLP
would be valued at $700,000 ($1,000,000 * 70%). However, if a 40% dis-
count applies to the interest, its value would be reduced by $280,000
($700,000 * 40%) to $420,000, thereby creating a significant tax savings.
Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 7-8.
45. Valuation Discounts, supa note 43.
46. See generally LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 11-19 (distinguishing lack
of control discount from lack of marketability discount); Top TAx IsSUES, supra
note 3, at 139-41 (same); Bissonette, supra note 1, at 62-65 (same); Bowen & Bailey,
supra note 2, at 333-35 (same); Forbat, supra note 2 (same); Mezzullo, supra note
28, at A-8-14 (same); Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 7-8 (same); Valuation Discounts,
supra note 43 (same). These discounts are not cumulative. See LEWIs &
CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing discounts). "[O]ne discount is applied
to reduce the value and the resulting valuation is subject to the second discount."
Id.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.2031-(1)(b) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (2004).
48. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (explaining impact that re-
strictions on limited partners have on market value of partnership interests).
7
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1. Lack of Marketability Discount
An FLP interest is discounted because the interest's lack of marketa-
bility reduces its fair market value. 4 9 The first factor affecting the marketa-
bility of an FLP interest is the difficulty in finding a third party who wants
to own an interest in a closely-held family entity.50 This is because buyers
are wary of the potential problems stemming from the family dynamic in-
herent in an FLP.5 1 Another factor impacting an FLP interest's marketa-
bility is the presence of a "restrictive transfer rights" provision in the
partnership agreement. 52 Many FLP partnership agreements contain a
provision that bars partners from assigning their FLP interests to unre-
lated third parties. 53 This further restricts the transferability of partner-
ship interests and subsequently reduces the value of the donor's
partnership interests. 54 The lack of marketability discount typically ranges
from twenty to forty percent.55
2. Lack of Control Discount
The lack of control discount, which also reflects the reduced fair mar-
ket value of an FLP interest, accounts for the restricted role a limited part-
49. See LEWIS and CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing lack of marketa-
bility discount within "willing buyer" framework). For an explanation of this
framework, see supra note 47 and accompanying text (providing explanation of
"willing buyer" framework used to determine fair market value of asset).
50. See Top TAx IssuEs, supra note 3, at 139 (arguing that interest in family
entity is "less attractive than an interest in an entity unsaddled with a 'family dy-
namic'"); see also Martha A. Zatezalo, Valuation Methods and Issues, in EsTAE-PLAN-
NING FOR THE OWNER OF A FAMILY BUSINESS 389, 401 (1998), reprinted from FAMILY
LIMITED PARTrNERSHIPS, PBI Publication No. 1997-1353 (1997) (noting that stranger
"might be unwilling to buy into family owned business").
51. See Zatezalo, supra note 50, at 401 (discussing FLP's inherent lack of
marketability).
52. See Top TAx IssuEs, supra note 3, at 134 (explaining that restrictive trans-
fers rights provision in FLP partnership agreement create discounts for lack of
marketability).
53. See Mezzullo, supa note 28, at A-6 (stating that owners of closely held
entities often desire to restrict transferring interests to third party). Alternatively,
an FLP partnership agreement may permit assignment of interests, but deny the
assignor the right to make the assignee a partner. Id. This also makes the FLP
interest difficult to transfer under the willing buyer analysis because the buyer
could not be guaranteed partnership status. Id.
54. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that transfer rights
restriction achieves dual goals of creating discount for lack of marketability and
preventing transfer to individuals outside family).
55. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 139 (providing percentage of discount
for lack of marketability); see also Michael Bourland et al., The Family Limited Part-
nership, Girt PLANNER'S Dic. (June 6, 1999), at http://www.pgdc.net/BRAF/GPD-
19990602152554 (noting that "[ t] he amount of the lack of marketability discount
is determined by comparable sales of restricted stock of publicly traded
companies").
1190 [Vol. 50: p. 1183
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ner plays in an FLP.5 6 Specifically, a limited partner has no control over
issues concerning distribution of profits and losses, forced liquidation and
the election of management.57 Control over such managerial decisions is
an attractive feature for potential buyers; therefore, under the fair market
value analysis, a non-controlling interest in an FLP is worth less than a
controlling interest.58 As a result, the IRS allows a twenty to forty percent
discount for limited partnership interests.
59
B. Non-Tax Benefits
In addition to the tax benefits already discussed, the FLP also offers a
number of non-tax advantages that relate to both the family's businesses
and estate-planning goals. 60 One significant business advantage the FLP
offers is ensuring the vitality of the family business after the senior mem-
ber's death. 6 1 Additional business advantages include consolidating man-
agement of family businesses, pooling the assets of family members,
reducing the expenses of managing assets and limiting the liability of indi-
vidual partners.6 2 For example, if the family members jointly own apart-
ment buildings or other ventures requiring ongoing management,
transferring the business into an FLP would be an ideal method for ensur-
ing cohesive and efficient management. 63
56. See LEWIs & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining discount for lack of
control). Further, a lack of control over management results in a lack of control
over the asset contributed to the FLP which includes an inability to influence deci-
sions related to the asset's disposition. See id. (highlighting fact that owner of lim-
ited partnership interest "lacks complete control over assets").
57. See id. (providing examples of limitations to limited partner's control over
FLP management).
58. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 334 (stating that non-controlling lim-
ited partnership interest is worth less than controlling interest).
59. See LEwIs & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing percentage for lack
of control discount); see also id. at 11-13 (noting that percentage of discount al-
lowed is context sensitive). The amount of the lack of control discount depends
upon "the amount of distributions made from the limited partnership to its part-
ners, the financial risk associated with the limited partnership's assets and the
terms of the limited partnership agreement." Bourland, supra note 55.
60. See Mezzullo, supra note 28, at A-1 (discussing tax and non-tax benefits of
using family limited partnerships to hold family businesses, investments and as-
sets); see also LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that FLPs serve multi-
ple ends for client seeking estate-planning advice).
61. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 316 (describing FLP as method of
preserving family business).
62. See LEwIs & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing business advan-
tages of FLP); Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 133-35 (specifying benefits of FLP
formation); Bowen & Bailey, supra note 2, at 339 (describing FLPs as "valuable
tool"); Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 4-6 (noting non-tax advantages of FLPs); Mez-
zullo, supra note 28, at A-21, A-37 (analyzing FLP advantages); Radowich, supra
note 28, at 290-96 (noting "specific goals achieved by Family Limited
Partnerships").
63. Interview withJames C. Fee,Jr., Associate Area Counsel, representative for
IRS in Thompson, in Villanova, Pa. (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Fee Interview] (dis-
cussing IRS position on FLPs).
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The FLP also provides estate-related benefits. 64 First, FLP member-
ship protects assets from creditors by restricting asset transferability. 65 Al-
though a creditor will be able to seize the indebted limited partner's FLP
interests, it will be unable to access the full value of the assets owned by the
FLP. 66 In addition, forming an FLP consolidates assets under a single en-
tity, which subsequently simplifies estate administration, diminishes the
burden of probate and protects assets from irresponsible family mem-
bers.67 Although tax advantages often induce FLP formation, the pres-
ence of these non-tax motivations-perhaps not surprisingly-is
ultimately the saving grace for an FLP under attack by the IRS.
68
IV. THE IRS's ATTACK ON FLPs UNDER SECTION 2036(a)
The IRS contends that using valuation discounts to reduce the value
of the decedent's gross estate abuses the purpose of an FLP.6 9 It has suc-
cessfully argued that Section 2036(a) operates to include the assets trans-
ferred to the FLP, and not the FLP interests received in exchange, in the
decedent's gross estate. 70 Section 2036(a) provides that the "gross estate
shall include the value of all property ...which the decedent has ...
transfer[red] (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
64. See LEwIs & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing estate related bene-
fits of FLP
65. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that restricting
transferability of assets protects assets from creditors); see also Top TAx IssuEs,
supra note 3, at 134 (noting creditors that sue FLPs cannot reach personal assets of
limited partners).
66. See S. Stacy Eastland, Overview of the Client Process in Forming, Maintaining
and Defending the Family Limited Partnership, in ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRA-
TION 118-19 (2002) (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course, Handbook Series
No. [96], 2002) (discussing inability of creditor to reach FLP assets to collect debt
of limited partner unless partner made fraudulent conveyance to partnership).
67. See Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing non-tax benefits of FLP); see
also id. (discussing "spendthrift protection"). One method for protecting against
irresponsible spending is to create an "agreement among the owners of a family
entity . . . [that] give[s] a manager of the entity the discretion to decide when
income or principal should be distributed to the owners. This allows a family en-
tity to control the access a financially irresponsible member has to his assets .... "
Id.
68. For a detailed discussion of the IRS argument in favor of including assets
transferred solely for tax purposes in decedent's gross estate under Section
2036(a), see infra notes 69-110 and accompanying text.
69. See Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing IRS litigation against valua-
tion discount for FLP interests).
70. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi 1), 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part,
rev'd in part and rem'd in part, (Strangi I), 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
Section 2036(a) included assets transferred to FLP in gross estate); Estate of
Harper v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 2002-121, Doc. 2002-11394 (holding limited partner-
ship property includable in gross estate); Estate of Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
144 (2000) (holding existence of implied agreement that decedent would retain
lifetime enjoyment of property made transferred assets includable in gross estate
under Section 2036(a)); Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1997-242,
Doc. 97-15298 (holding value of FLP assets includable in gross estate).
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full consideration in money or money's worth), . . . [in] which he has
retained for his life... the possession or enjoyment of [the property]."71
Once Section 2036(a) includes the transferred assets in the decedent's
gross estate, valuation discounts become irrelevant because including both
the transferred assets and the FLP interests received in exchange would
constitute an impermissible double counting of the decedent's assets.7 2 In
sum, Section 2036(a) may negate the tax benefits of an FLP if (1) the
donor/decedent retained an interest in the transferred property, and (2)
the transfer does not comport with Section 2036(a)'s bona fide sale
exception.
73
A. Retained Interest Under Section 2036(a)
Section 2036(a) applies when there is an express or implied agree-
ment at the time of the transfer that the transferor will retain lifetime
enjoyment or possession of the transferred assets. 74 The existence of an
implied agreement is a question of fact that must be determined in light
of the surrounding facts and circumstances.7 5 Courts interpreting Section
2036(a) have indicated that the decedent retained an interest in the prop-
erty if the decedent failed to respect the partnership form and used the
71. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (2004). The full text of the statute provides:
General Rule: The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either along or in conjunction with any person, to des-
ignate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom.
Id.
72. See Ruttenberg, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that inclusion of assets under
Section 2036(a) makes "any claimed valuation discounts irrelevant").
73. Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1337 (2003) (holding assets transferred by
decedent to FLP included in gross estate under Section 2036(a)); Harper, T.C.M.
2002-121 (holding property contributed to FLP includable in gross estate);
Reichardt, 114 T.C. 144 (holding decedent's assets includable in gross estate);
Schauerhamer, T.C.M. 1997-242 (holding same). But see Donald C. Poole, Family
Limited Partnerships Need an Exodus from Section 2036(a), TAx NOTES, Oct. 27, 2003, at
542 (arguing against application of Section 2036(a) to assets transferred to FLP on
grounds that term "transfer" in Section 2036(a) "contemplates a transfer to an-
other person in the nature of a gift" as opposed to transfer to business entity).
74. See Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 375 (3d Cir. 2004) ("'An interest
or right is treated as having been retained or reserved if at the time of the transfer
there was an understanding, expressed or implied, that the interest or right would
later be conferred.'" (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1(a) (2004))).
75. See Schauerhamer, T.C.M. 1997-242, at 10 (citing Estate of Hendry v. Com-
missioner, 62 T.C. 861, 872 (1974)) (inferring implied agreement from "facts and
circumstances of the transfer and the subsequent use of property").
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partnership assets for personal benefit despite a change in legal owner-
ship.76 The threshold inquiry is whether the facts suggest "the decedent's
relationship to transferred assets remained the same after as it was before the
transfer."77
The first indication of an implied agreement is the commingling of
personal and partnership assets. 7 8 In Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commis-
sioner,79 the Tax Court held that the donor/decedent violated the partner-
ship agreement by transferring assets to an FLP and subsequently
depositing the income generated from those assets into her personal ac-
count. 80 This commingling of assets raised the inference of an implied
agreement because the decedent continued to use and access the funds
after the asset transfer.8 1 The Tax Court reached a similar conclusion in
Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner8 2 when it held that commingling of assets
suggested an implied agreement, despite "post mortem" accounting ad-
76. See infra notes 79-112 (summarizing reasoning supporting prior rulings in
which courts applied Section 2036(a) to include transferred assets in decedent's
gross estate).
77. Thompson, 383 F.3d at 377 (quoting Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d
1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)); see also Reichardt, 114 T.C. 144, 152
(citing Guynn for same proposition).
78. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 102 (defining commingling of
assets as failure to acknowledge distinction between partnership and personal as-
sets). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's response to commingling of assets,
see infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's finding of
implied agreement based on evidence that decedent commingled personal and
FLP assets). For guidelines to follow to avoid commingling of assets, see infra
notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
79. 73 T.C.M (CCH) 2855 (1997).
80. See id. at 4 (discussing decedents commingling of personal and partner-
ship assets). In Shauerhamer, the decedent formed a separate FLP with each of her
three children. See id. at 1 (discussing facts). The decedent contributed a one
third undivided interest in her business holdings to each FLP. Id. The FLPs were
validly formed and each FLP drafted a partnership agreement that set forth de-
tailed provisions related to partnership records, allocations of profits and losses
and agency relationships among partners. Id. at 2. The agreements also required
that all partnership income be deposited in partnership accounts. Id. Despite this
requirement, the decedent deposited both partnership and non-partnership in-
come into partnership accounts. See id. (noting decedent's violation of partner-
ship agreement). The decedent did not maintain records to account separately
for partnership and non-partnership funds. Id. In addition, the decedent used
the partnership account "as her personal checking account, and from this account
she paid personal and partnership expenses." Id. The court concluded that this
conduct raised an inference of an implied agreement that the decedent would
retain lifetime enjoyment of the transferred assets. See id. (holding that Section
2036(a) applied to transferred assets).
81. See id. (finding implied agreement that "assets and income would be man-
aged by the decedent exactly as they had been in the past"). As evidence of this
agreement, the court pointed to the fact that the decedent's children each testi-
fied that the FLPs were formed to enable the decedent to assign partnership inter-
ests to family members. See id. (discussing testimony of decedent's children).
82. 114 T.C. 144 (2000).
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justments that separated the decedent's personal assets from those of the
partnership.
8 3
A second indication of an implied agreement is the donor/dece-
dent's failure to retain sufficient funds for personal expenses.8 4 In Estate
of Strangi v. Commissioner,8 5 the court concluded that the decedent's failure
to retain sufficient personal assets suggested that the FLP "would be a pri-
mary source of [the] decedent's liquidity" following his transfer to the
FLP.86 Overall, Schauerhamer, Reichardt and Strangi stand for the proposi-
tion that a transfer to an FLP will not withstand scrutiny under Section
2036(a) absent strict adherence to the partnership form.
87
B. Section 2036(a) Bona Fide Sale Exception
Section 2036(a) contains a significant exception: the decedent's gross
estate does not include transferred assets if the transfer was a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
88
There is, accordingly, a two-part inquiry into the applicability of this ex-
83. See id. at 155 (characterizing adjustments as nothing more than "a belated
attempt to undo decedent's commingling of partnership and personal accounts").
In this case, the decedent formed an FLP and a revocable living trust to serve as
the FLP's sole general partner. See id. at 147-48 (discussing formation of FLP and
trust). The decedent transferred nearly all of his property to the FLP, with the
exception of his car and a small amount of cash. Id. The decedent, however,
continued to live rent-free in the residence that he contributed to the FLP. Id. at
149. In addition, the decedent deposited partnership assets in his personal ac-
counts. See id. at 148 (discussing decedent's commingling of assets). These facts
led the court to conclude that the transferred assets should be included in the
decedent's gross estate under Section 2036(a). See id. at 153 (holding circum-
stances raised inference of implied agreement that decedent would retain lifetime
enjoyment of transferred assets within meaning of Section 2036(a)).
84. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of the decedent's
failure to retain sufficient personal funds in Thompson, see infra note 140 and ac-
companying text (noting Third Circuit's conclusion that decedent's failure to re-
tain sufficient personal funds raised inference of implied agreement within
meaning of Section 2036(a)).
85. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003).
86. Id. at 1336. In this case, the decedent formed an FLP with his children
and established a corporation to serve as its general partner. Id. The decedent
contributed ninety-eight percent of his assets to the FLP, including his residence.
Id. After the transfer, however, the decedent continued to live in the residence
rent-free. Id. at 1336. In addition, more than $3,000,000 was subsequently trans-
ferred out of the partnership to pay for decedent's healthcare, funeral and estate
expenses. See id. (detailing use of partnership assets for personal expenses).
These factors influenced the court's conclusion that the decedent retained life-
time enjoyment of the transferred property for purposes of Section 2036(a). See id.
at 1338 (stating holding).
87. See id. at 1338 (finding that "[although] the proverbial i's were dotted and
the t's were crossed ... [t]hey do not preclude implicit retention ... of [present]
economic benefit from the transferred property").
88. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1) (2004).
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ception.8 9 The first issue is whether the transfer was a bona fide sale. 90
The second issue is whether the transfer was made for full and adequate
consideration. 91 It is important to note that the Tax Court and the Fifth
Circuit are divided regarding the definition of a bona fide sale.92 Namely,
the Tax Court's interpretation categorically disqualifies FLP transfers from
exclusionary treatment under Section 2036(a), while the Fifth Circuit ap-
proach only requires that the court determine whether the sale was made
in good faith or was instead "a sham transaction."93
1. Bona Fide Sale
The first step in establishing whether a transferred asset falls within
the scope of a bona fide sales exception is, clearly, determining whether
the transfer was a bona fide sale.94 The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit
have set forth conflicting rules regarding the requisite elements of a bona
fide sale. 95 In Reichardt and Strangi, the Tax Court held that a bona fide
sale required an arm's length transaction. 96 By contrast, in Wheeer, the
Fifth Circuit explicitly refused to rule that a bona fide sale must be made
at arm's length. 9 7 While the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that intra-family
transfers should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, the court neverthe-
less concluded that a bona fide sale is any sale in which "the transferor
89. See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text (providing explanation of
two-step analysis required by Section 2036 to determine whether assets transferred
by decedent into FLP should be included in decedent's gross estate).
90. See Section 2036(a) (providing that sale must be bona fide). For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's definition of a bona fide sale and the reasoning behind
this definition, see infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
91. See Section 2036(a) (providing that sale must be made for full and ade-
quate consideration). For further discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation
of full and adequate consideration within the meaning of Section 2036(a), see
infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
92. For a discussion of this conflict, see infra notes 95-102 (highlighting con-
flict between Tax Court and Fifth Circuit as to whether bona fide sale requires
arm's length transaction for purposes of Section 2036(a)).
93. Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 767 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Thompson v.
Comm'r, 382 F.3d 382, 382 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating arm's length transaction re-
quirement would "automatically defeat the Section 2036 exception for all intra-
family transfers").
94. See Kimbel, 371 F.3d at 264 (discussing bona fide sale).
95. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381-82 (discussing conflict between Tax Court's
and Fifth Circuit's definition of bona fide sale).
96. See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1343 (2003)
(holding bona fide sale requires arm's length transaction); Reichardt v. Comm'r,
114 T.C. 144, 155 (2000) (defining bona fide sale as "an arm's-length business
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller").
97. See Wheeler, 116 F.3d at 764 (defining bona fide sale). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that Section 2036(a) did not require "a dual system of valuation" for
transfers "depending on the identity of the purchaser." Id. at 765.
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actually parted with the remainder interest and the transferee actually
parted with the requisite adequate and full consideration."
98
The Fifth Circuit solidified its Wheeler holding in Kimbell v. United
States.99 In Kimbell, the court once again rejected the notion that an intra-
familial transfer can never be bona fide, stating that a "transaction that is a
bona fide sale between strangers must also be bona fide between members
of the same family."10 0 The court refused to impose an additional require-
ment on intra-family transfers without a statutory basis for such action.
10 1
In sum, the Tax Court narrowly defines a bona fide sale by focusing on the
parties to the transaction, while the Fifth Circuit takes a broader approach
that is more concerned with the substance of the transaction than the rela-
tionship between the parties.
10 2
2. Full and Adequate Consideration
The second determination for purposes of Section 2036(a)'s bona
fide sales exception is whether the sale was made for full and adequate
consideration.10 3 In Estate of Harper v. Commissioner,1 0 4 the Tax Court an-
98. Id. at 764.
99. 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004). In Kimbell, the decedent formed an FLP
with her son and contributed $2,500,000 in oil and gas interests and cash. See id. at
259 (summarizing formation of FLP). The decedent retained $450,000 in assets
for personal expenses. See id. (noting that decedent retained considerable per-
sonal funds). The FLP partnership agreement clearly stated the purposes of for-
mation, which included protection of partners from creditors, providing flexibility
of business planning and consolidating family assets. See id. at 259-60 (discussing
details of partnership agreement).
100. Id. at 263.
101. See id. (citing Wheeler, 116 F.3d at 764) (noting Wheeler established that
"just because a transaction takes place between family members does not impose
an additional requirement not set forth in the statute to establish that it is bona
fide").
102. See id. (holding that key issue is not whether parties operated at arm's
length but whether sale was based on legitimate business objectives). It is impor-
tant to note that the Tax Court appears to have modified its arm's length require-
ment following the Third Circuit's ruling in Thompson. See Steven R. Akers,
Bongard-"En Guard" to FLP Owners! 13-14 (2005), at http://www.abanet.org/
rppt/cmtes/pt/c-group/BongardOverview.pdf (discussing new standard for bona
fide sales set forth by Tax Court in Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 8 (2005)).
While prior Tax Court cases held that an arm's length transaction was a requisite
element of a Section 2036(a) bona fide sale, the court in Bongard retreated from
this position when it concluded that parties need not actually be strangers so long
as an intra-familial transfer was "conducted as if the parties were strangers." Bon-
gard, 124 T.C. at 8. This change in the Tax Court's analysis is likely the result of
the fact that the prior approach conflicted with that of the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits. See Akers, supra, at 13 (characterizing change in Tax Court's bona fide sale
analysis as reaction to disagreement from circuit courts).
103. See 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1) (2004) (providing that bona fide sale must be
made for full and adequate consideration).
104. 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 (2002). In Harper, the decedent formed an FLP
with his children and contributed the majority of his assets to the FLP. Id. at 3.
These assets were primarily marketable securities and the partnership agreement
2005] CASEBRIEF 1197
15
Bishow: Death and Taxes: The Family Limited Partnership and Its Use in Es
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
nounced the "recycling of value" theory, which was subsequently adopted
by the Fifth Circuit in Kimbell and the Third Circuit in Thompson.
105
Under this theory, when a transfer serves only to "change the form in
which [the donor] held his beneficial interest in the contributed property
... [w]ithout any change whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or
prospect for profit . . . there exists nothing but a circuitous 'recycling of
value.' "106
The overriding issue under this theory is legitimate business concerns
motivated the decedent's transfer.10 7 In Harper, the Tax Court concluded
that the decedent's transfer was not motivated by a legitimate purpose be-
cause the FLP offered no prospect for profit.108 Similarly, in Strangi, the
Tax Court found that the FLP lacked a legitimate business purpose be-
cause the only economic activities conducted by the FLP related to the
decedent's health, funeral and estate tax expenses. 10 9 In both cases, the
Tax Court concluded that the transfers were not made for adequate con-
sideration. °1 0 By contrast, in Kimbell, the court found a legitimate business
purpose thereby upholding the transfer where the FLP centralized man-
agement of the family business and protected the partners from tort liabil-
ity. 1' From these cases, it is clear that the courts are looking for transfers
that provided the decedent with an economic benefit apart from tax ad-
provided that the FLP's business purpose was to manage this stock portfolio. Id.
As in previous cases, the decedent commingled personal and partnership assets.
See id. at 12 (finding that commingling of assets displayed "egregious" disregard for
partnership fund). This commingling of assets, along with the decedent's failure
to retain sufficient personal funds, supported the Tax Court's conclusion that the
decedent retained an interest in the transferred property within the meaning of
Section 2036(a). See id. at 16 (stating holding).
105. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2004)
(applying recycling of value theory to determine whether transfer was made for
full and adequate consideration); see also Kimbel1 371 F.3d at 262 (same). For a
complete discussion of the Third Circuit's recycling of value analysis in Thompson,
see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
106. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 at 17 (emphasis added). The court ac-
cepting the validity of such a transfer, "would open [S]ection 2036(a) to a myriad
of abuses engendered by unilateral paper transformations." Id.
107. See id. at 18 (holding no transfer for consideration occurs where transac-
tion is not motivated by legitimate business concerns). For the Third Circuit's
position on the legitimate business concern requirement set forth in Harper, see
infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's view that le-
gitimate business purpose is essential element of full and adequate consideration
within meaning of Section 2036(a)).
108. See Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 at 17 (noting that decedent derived
no economic benefit from FLP aside from tax advantages).
109. See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1344 (2003)
(concluding that FLP "patently fails to qualify as the sort of functioning business
enterprise that could potentially . .. lift the situation beyond mere recycling").
110. See Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 at 17 (holding transfer not made for
full and adequate consideration for purposes of Section 2036(a)); see also Strangi,
85 T.C.M (CCH) at 1344 (same).
111. See Kimbel4 371 F.3d at 269 (holding transfer was made for full and ade-
quate consideration after concluding that centralizing management of family busi-
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vantages when considering whether the transfer was made for full and ade-
quate consideration.
1 12
V. ESTATE OF THOMPSON V. COMMISSIONER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TIGHTENS THE REIGNS BUT DOES NOT CLOSE THE DOOR
A. Facts of Thompson
In 1993, the decedent Theodore Thompson established an FLP with
each of his two children and created two corporations to serve as the FLP's
general partners. 113 The decedent formed the Turner FLP and the Tur-
ner Corporation with his daughter Betsy Turner and his daughter's hus-
band George.11 4 The decedent contributed a considerable sum of
marketable securities and notes receivable while the Turners contributed
a comparatively nominal amount of cash and real estate.' 15 The parties
received limited partner interests in exchange for these contributions.1 16
The FLP held the marketable securities contributed by the decedent but
engaged in minimal "post-transfer trading."' 17 In 1994, the FLP agree-
ment was amended to allocate the economic gains and losses from all con-
tributed assets to the individual contributing partners as opposed to the
FLP itself.1 1 8 From the time of formation, the FLP made a number of
ness and protection of partners from tort liability constituted legitimate business
purposes).
112. See Howell, supra note 15, at 734 (emphasizing importance of business
purpose behind transfer and "transferee entity").
113. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing formation of FLPs and corporate general partners). By the time the
partnerships were formed, the decedent had transferred $2,800,000 to the Turner
and Thompson partnership, $2,500,000 of which was comprised of marketable se-
curities. See id. at 370 (discussing total amount transferred by decedent to family
limited partnerships). The decedent retained $153,000 in personal assets. Id.
The decedent also received an annual income of $14,000 from social security and
two annuities. Id. The decedent's annual expenses were $57,202 and his life ex-
pectancy was 4.1 years at the time of the transfer. Id.
114. See id. (discussing formation of FLP and corporation). The Turner Cor-
poration held the sole general partner interest in the Turner FLP. Id. at 370.
115. See id. (discussing contributions to FLP). The decedent's contribution to
the partnership totaled $1,286,000. Id. George Turner contributed $1,000 in cash
and a piece of real property in Vermont with a fair market value of $49,000. Id.
116. See id. (discussing partnership interests). The decedent received a 95.4%
limited partner interest in Turner Partnership. Id. George and Betsy Turner re-
ceived a 3.46% limited partnership interest. Id.
117. See id. (noting that partnership did not actively trade securities trans-
ferred by decedent).
118. See id. at 371 (discussing amendment of Turner Partnership agreement).
The decision to amend the partnership agreement arose out of a concern about
the taxation of the partnership, namely that the "initial capitalization of the part-
nership might present certain investment company issues pursuant to [I.R.C.]
[S]ection 721(b) which could affect the intended nonrecognition treatment of
capital contributions to the partnership." Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 84
T.C.M. 374 (2002). For more information on Section 721 (b) and the definition of
an investment company, see What You Should Know About Your Limited Partnership, at
11992005] CAEBRIEF
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distributions of cash and FLP interests to the decedent from the FLP's
account. 119
The decedent also formed the Thompson FLP and the Thompson
Corporation with his son Robert Thompson. 120 The decedent contrib-
uted marketable securities and notes receivable to the FLP. 12 1 Robert
Thompson contributed mutual funds and real estate to the FLP. 122 Al-
though the Thompson FLP consisted primarily of marketable securities, as
in the Turner FLP, there was little post-transfer trading activity. 123 Moreo-
ver, the gain derived from the FLP's negligible business activities did not
go to the FLP but went directly to Robert Thompson. 24 In 1995, the FLP
made several cash and partnership distributions to the decedent from the
FLP's account, and the decedent used a portion of the cash distributions
to pay personal expenses. 125
The decedent died on May 15, 1995, at the age of ninety-seven. 126
On February 21, 1996 the decedent's executors filed a federal estate tax
return that valued the decedent's taxable estate at $1,762,219.127 This
amount included the discounted value of the decedent's interests in the
Thompson and Turner FLPs. 128 In January 1999, the IRS filed a notice of
deficiency in the amount of $707,054.129 The Commissioner's disallow-
ance of the valuation discounts on the decedent's FLP interests was the
most significant component of the deficiency.' 3 0
http://www.trustsandestates.net/Excel/MmClInvestmentCoRulesRTF.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2005) (discussing Section 721 (b)).
119. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 371-72 (noting partnership made annual dis-
tributions to decedent of $40,000 to $45,220).
120. See id. at 370 (discussing formation of Thompson Partnership and
Thompson Corporation). The Thompson Corporation held the sole general part-
ner interest in the FLP. Id.
121. See id. (summarizing decedent's contribution to FLP).
122. See id. (summarizing Robert Thompson's contribution to FLP).
123. See id. at 371 (discussing partnership's failure to actively trade securities
contributed by decedent and Robert Thompson).
124. See id. (discussing Robert Thompson's use of contributed real estate to
raise and sell mules despite fact that income generated by this activity did not
benefit partnership).
125. See id. at 371-72. As with the Turner FLP, the Thompson FLP made an-
nual distributions ranging from $40,000 to $45,220. See id. (summarizing cash dis-
tributions made to decedent from FLP account).
126. See id. at 372 (relating date of decedent's death).
127. See id. (stating initial valuation of decedent's taxable estate).
128. See id. (detailing valuation discounts applied by estate to decedent's FLP
interests). For further discussion of valuation discounts, see supra notes 44-59 and
accompanying text.
129. See id. (discussing substance of IRS notice of deficiency).
130. See id. (stating that Commissioner disallowed estate's twenty percent mi-
nority discount and twenty percent lack of marketability discount). The adjust-
ment ultimately increased the value of the decedent's gross estate by $1,400,627.
See id. (summarizing effect of IRS disallowance adjustment on decedent's gross
estate).
[Vol. 50: p. 11831200
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 5 [2005], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss5/2
The estate filed a petition for redetermination in the Tax Court.13 1
The Tax Court held that the transferred assets were included in the dece-
dent's gross estate under Section 2036(a) because the decedent and his
children had an implied agreement that the decedent would retain life-
time enjoyment of the transferred assets. 13 2 The Tax Court also found
that the transfers to the FLP did not fall within Section 2036(a)'s bona fide
sale exception because the transfers were 1) not made at arm's length and
2) not made for adequate consideration. 1 3 3 The estate filed a timely no-
tice of appeal with the Third Circuit.
134
B. Third Circuit's Ruling in Thompson
The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's ruling after concluding
that the decedent and his children had an implied agreement that he
would retain lifetime enjoyment of the transferred property. 13 5 The Third
Circuit further concluded that the decedent's transfer did not fall within
the Section 2036(a) bona fide sale exception, but it relied on different
grounds than those proffered by the Tax Court.136 Specifically, the Third
Circuit rejected the Tax Court's definition of a bona fide sale.137 Despite
this difference, the Third Circuit ultimately included the transferred assets
in the decedent's gross estate under Section 2036(a). 138
1. Retained Enjoyment Under Section 2036(a)
The Third Circuit found sufficient evidence that an implied agree-
ment existed between the decedent and his children that enabled the de-
cedent to retain lifetime enjoyment of the transferred assets. 139 First, at
the age of ninety-five, the decedent transferred a majority of his assets to
131. See id. at 373 (relating estate's petition for redetermination of decedent's
gross estate).
132. See id. (reviewing Tax Court's application of Section 2036(a)).
133. See id. (stating holding).
134. See id. (noting estate's appeal of Tax Court ruling).
135. See id. at 377 (affirming Tax Court's finding of implied agreement that
decedent would retain lifetime enjoyment of transferred property within meaning
of Section 2036(a)).
136. See id. at 381 (holding that decedent's transfer did not constitute bona
fide sale for purposes of Section 2036(a)'s bona fide sale exception).
137. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's departure from the Tax Court's
reasoning, see infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
138. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 383 (stating holding).
139. See id. at 377 (same). The court cited Reichardt for the proposition that
an implied agreement may be inferred from the factual circumstances surround-
ing the transfer. See id. at 376 (citing Estate of Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144,
151 (2000)). Accordingly, the Third Circuit reviewed the Tax Court's factual find-
ings for clear error. See id. at 374 (citing PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm'r, 212 F.3d
822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000)) (stating appropriate standard of review).
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the FLPs without retaining sufficient assets for personal expenses. 140 In
addition, the court noted that Betsy and George Turner consulted their
financial advisors to ensure that the decedent would have access to the
partnership assets. 14 1 Finally, on more than one occasion, the FLP "in-
fused" the decedent with funds when his personal assets diminished. 142 In
light of these facts, the court concluded that the decedent's "de jure" lack
of control over the transferred property did not overcome the strong in-
ference of an implied agreement that the decedent would retain lifetime
enjoyment of the transferred property. 143
2. Section 2036(a) Bona Fide Sale Exception
The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's finding that the trans-
ferred assets did not fall within the scope of Section 2036(a)'s bona fide
sale exception. 1 44 The court agreed that the transfers were not made for
adequate consideration because the FLPs lacked a legitimate business pur-
pose. 145 The court also found that the transfers did not constitute bona
fide sales, but it declined to impose the Tax Court's arm's length transac-
tion requirement. 146 Instead, the Third Circuit held that the transfers
were not bona fide sales due to a lack of good faith.
1 47
a. Full and Adequate Consideration
The Third Circuit held that the transfers were not made for full and
adequate consideration for purposes of Section 2036(a).1 4 3 Applying
Harper's recycling of value theory, the Third Circuit found that the trans-
fers were not made for adequate consideration because they were not mo-
tivated by legitimate business concerns. 14 9 Neither FLP engaged in
140. See id. at 376 (concluding that failure to retain sufficient personal funds
raised inference of implied agreement that decedent would retain lifetime enjoy-
ment of transferred property).
141. See id. (finding concern about decedent's ability to access partnership
assets as indicia of implied agreement).
142. See id. (referring to decedent's commingling of personal and partnership
assets).
143. See id. at 376 (concluding that formal transfer of assets to partnership did
not defeat argument that decedent and children had implied agreement that de-
cedent would retain lifetime enjoyment of transferred assets). The court con-
cluded that it was clear from the operation of the partnerships that "nothing
beyond formal title changed in the decedent's relationship to his assets." Id. at
377.
144. See id. at 383 (affirming Tax Court's ruling on bona fide sale element of
Section 2036(a) analysis).
145. For factors that influenced the Third Circuit's full and adequate consid-
eration analysis, see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
146. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381-82 (rejecting argument that bona fide sale
required arm's length bargaining).
147. See id. at 383 (holding bona fide sale requires good faith dealing).
148. See id. at 381 (stating holding).
149. See id. at 378-79 (citing Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH)
1331, 1344 (2003); Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1653
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significant business operations, and what little income the FLPs' assets
generated went directly to the other partners, not the decedent.
150
The Third Circuit also concluded that the decedent received no eco-
nomic benefit from the transfers because the marketable securities re-
mained largely untraded after the decedent transferred them to the
FLP.15 1 Moreover, because the decedent transferred his liquid assets in
return for illiquid partnership interests, the consideration the decedent
received was of lesser value than the transferred assets. 15 2 These factors,
accompanied by the FLPs' lack of legitimate business operations, led the
court to conclude that the decedent received a tax benefit in considera-
tion for the transfers.' 53 Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that there
was no transfer for full and adequate consideration within the meaning of
Section 2036(a). 15 4
b. Bona Fide Sale
The Third Circuit also held that the transfers did not constitute a
bona fide sale. 155 Following the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Kimbel4 the court
conceded that, in light of the "mischief that may arise in the family estate-
planning context," intra-family transfers to FLPs must be reviewed with
heightened scrutiny.' 56 Notwithstanding this finding, the Third Circuit
refused to adopt a per se exclusion of transfers to FLPs from Section
2036(a)'s bona fide sale exception. 157 The court emphasized that, despite
contradictory case law from the Tax Court, there was no statutory basis for
(2002)) (providing overview of prior litigation under recycling of value theory).
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the partnerships did conduct some eco-
nomic activity, but nonetheless concluded that these transactions "did note rise to
the level of legitimate business operations." Id. at 379.
150. See id. at 380 (concluding that profit distributions "denied [the] dece-
dent any non-tax benefit potentially derived from assets collected in the
partnership").
151. See id. (discussing lack of post transfer trading of marketable securities
contributed by decedent).
152. See id. at 381 (reasoning that "[i]f assets are transferred inter vivos in
exchange for other assets of lesser value, it seems reasonable to conclude there is
no transfer for 'full and adequate consideration'").
153. See id. at 379 (finding no substantive non-tax benefit justifying decedent
contributions to FLPs).
154. See id. (stating court's holding).
155. See id. at 381 (concluding that "decedent's transfers to the family limited
partnership do not constitute 'bona fide sales' within the meaning of 2036(a)").
156. See id. at 382 (acknowledging that "'when the transaction is between fam-
ily members, it is subject to heightened scrutiny"' (quoting Kimbell v. United
States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004))). The Third Circuit found that this
heightened scrutiny was necessary when reviewing intra-familial transfers in light
of the "mischief that may arise in the family estate-planning context." Id.
157. See id. (rejecting uniform prohibition on transfers to FLPs). The court
concluded that an estate's claim will not fail solely on the grounds that the dece-
dent "stood on both side [s] of the transaction" as transferor on the one hand and
partner in the FLP on the other hand. Id. (quoting Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r,
85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1343 (2003)).
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making an arm's length transaction requisite to a bona fide sale.158 Ac-
cordingly, the court adopted the Fifth Circuit's view in Kimbell and held
that a transfer constitutes a bona fide sale so long as the parties actually
parted with their interests in the exchanged property.' 59
This notwithstanding, the Third Circuit concluded that the transfer
in Thompson was not a bona fide sale because it was not made in good
faith.' 6 0 The court stated that a transfer is made in good faith only if the
transferor receives a genuine business-related benefit apart from estate tax
advantages. 1 6' As such, the same factors that indicated the transfer was
not made for full and adequate consideration also led the court to con-
clude that the transfers were not made in good faith.' 62 Accordingly, the
court held that the decedent's transfers to the FLPs were not bona fide
sales for full and adequate consideration within the meaning of Section
2036(a).1 63
VI. CRITICISM OF APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036(a) IN THOMPSON
At least one practitioner in the estate planning field argues that it is
inappropriate to apply Section 2036(a) to transfers made to an FLP.16 4
The practitioner claims that cases such as Thompson applied the wrong law
in deciding FLP cases because they failed to adhere to in pari materia, a
basic rule of statutory construction. 165 Namely, when a section constitutes
one part of a comprehensive statutory provision, that section should be
158. See id. (reasoning that neither IRC nor applicable Treasury Regulations
set forth arm's length transaction requirement when defining bona fide sale).
159. See id. (quoting Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 265).
160. See id. at 383 (stating good faith requirement for bona fide transaction).
161. See id. (discussing elements of good faith transfer). The court empha-
sized that a contrived transaction motivated exclusively by estate tax planning will
not be recognized as a bona fide sale. See id. (emphasizing that bona fide transac-
tion requires benefit separate and apart from tax advantage). For an example of
the business advantages offered by the formation of an FLP, see supra notes 3748
and accompanying text.
162. See id. (noting that objective indicia of legitimate business operations
provides "sufficient factual basis for finding a good faith transfer"). For the court's
review of the FLPs' business operations, see supra notes 150-51 and accompanying
text (finding lack of legitimate business operations).
163. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 383 (stating holding).
164. See generally Donald C. Poole, Family Limited Partnerships Need an Exodus
from Section 2036(a), TAx NoTEs, Oct. 27, 2003, at 541-47 (criticizing application of
Section 2036(a) in FLP cases).
165. See id. (citing Thompson, 382 F.3d at 373; Kimbell v. United States, 371
F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641
(2002); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi 1), 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part,
rev'd in part and rem'd in part, (Strangi I1), 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of
Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997)) (arguing that FLP cases applying Section 2036(a)
have "totally missed the boat" by incorrectly interpreting Section 2036(a) as appli-
cable to transfers made to FLP).
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construed in light of the other sections to which it relates. 16 6 The practi-
tioner argues that FLP cases violated this principle by considering the
meaning of the word "transfer" for purposes of Section 2036(a) without
regard for how the word has been interpreted in related code sections.
1 67
In doing so, the courts in these cases mistakenly applied Section 2036(a)
in a manner that is incongruent with the legislative purpose of the
statute.1
68
The argument against application of Section 2036(a) to transfers
made to an FLP is that it violates the rule of in pari materia. 1 69 This well-
established principle of statutory construction provides that "statutes are
not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as
parts of a great, connected, homogeneous system." 170 In Whee/er, the Fifth
Circuit noted that Supreme Court precedent supported its conclusion that
the estate and gift tax sections of the IRC should be read inpari materia.
17 1
Accordingly, when applying Section 2036(a), the meaning of the word
"transfer" should be construed as it is construed in code sections related to
the taxation of gifts. 1 7 2
As a rule, cases interpreting the word transfer within the gift context
contemplate a disposition of property made with a donative intent to an-
other person.'73 Therefore, Section 2036(a) "was intended to apply to an
inter vivos transfer in the nature a gift where the transferor has retained
an interest in the gifted property. 1 74 If this is true, then Section 2036(a)
166. See 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 103 (2004) (providing summary of in pari
materia rule of statutory interpretation). For more on the rule of in pari materia,
see infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (defining rule and detailing its appli-
cation in context of Section 2036(a)).
167. See Poole, supra note 164, at 547 (characterizing cases applying Section
2036(a) in FLP context as examples of incorrect judicial interpretation of term
"transfer"); see also id. (stating that expansive view of Section 2036(a) is "motivated
by strong distaste for what they view as abusive FLPs").
168. See id. (reasoning that using Section 2036(a) as method of attacking FLPs
"runs afoul" of statutory scheme).
169. See id. at 541-42 (arguing that FLP cases applying Section 2036(a) ig-
nored rule of in pai materia when construing meaning of word "transfer").
170. 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 103 (2004).
171. See Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 761 (5th Cir. 1997) ("'The
gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in pari materia and must be
construed together."' (quoting Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945); Es-
tate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 43-45 (1939))).
172. See Poole, supra note 164, at 542 (noting existence of analogy between
meaning of "transfer" in Section 2036(a) and gift tax sections of IRC).
173. See Church v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-804, 2000-1 (stat-
ing that term "transfer" in context of gift taxation refers only to transfers that are
gratuitous in nature).
174. Poole, supra note 164, at 542. The author provides three examples of
transfers to which Section 2036 would properly apply: "(1) a transfer to a trust
where a beneficial interest in another persona was created, (2) the transfer of a fee
interest of property to another with the transferor retaining an actual or implied
right to use the property, and (3) the contribution of assets to an entity that in-
creases the equity of another owner." Id. at 547.
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should not apply to transfers in the form of contributions made pursuant
to formation of an FLP because such a transfer lacks the requisite donative
intent. 175 The ruling in Church v. United States176 supports this argu-
ment. 17 7 In that case, the IRS argued that the transferor made a gratui-
tous transfer because the decedent's partnership interests exceeded the
value of the assets she contributed to the FLP. 178 The district court re-
jected the IRS's argument by citing Whee/er's in pari materia interpretations
of the term "transfer" in both the gift and estate tax sections of the IRC. 179
The court reasoned that a gratuitous transfer could never result from the
"formation of a business entity in which each partner's interest is propor-
tional to the capital contributed."' 8 0 As a result, the court held that Sec-
tion 2036(a) was not applicable to the assets transferred by the decedent
to the FLP. 18 1
In Thompson, the decedent contributed the majority of his assets to
the FLP and received a majority interest in both the Thompson and Tur-
ner FLPs.lR 2 Therefore, according to the reasoning proffered in Church,
the court in Thompson should not have applied Section 2036(a) to the de-
cedent's transfers to the FLPs because they were not gratuitous trans-
fers. 183 While this argument is legally and logically sound, neither the Tax
Court nor the circuit courts have chosen to adopt Church's analysis.' 8 4 As
a result, the issue is likely to become ripe for Supreme Court review in the
future. 18 5
175. See id. at 546 (noting that recent case law does not recognize transfers to
FLP as meeting "lifetime gift" standard within meaning of Section 2036).
176. 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-804, 2000-1.
177. See id. (holding that, in absence of gratuitous transfer upon formation,
Section 2036(a) does not apply to contributions made to FLP).
178. See id. (arguing in favor of applying Section 2036(a)"to include assets
transferred by decedent to FLP in decedent's gross estate). Specifically, the IRS
maintained that, because the decedent contributed assets worth $1,467,748 and
received an FLP interest worth $617,591, someone must have received a gratuitous
transfer of the difference between the two amounts. See id. (expounding upon
IRS's claim).
179. See id. (refusing to accept IRS's argument).
180. Id.
181. See id. (stating holding).
182. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 370 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing facts). For a more comprehensive summary of this information, see
supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
183. See Poole, supra note .164, at 545 (criticizing application of Section
2036(a) to transfers similar to one at issue in Thompson).
184. See id. at 546 (noting that Church decision "has remained rather ob-
scure"). Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in an un-
published opinion, it nonetheless applied Section 2036(a) in an FLP case in
Kimbell. See Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that Section 2036(a) applies to transfers made to FLP). Thus, the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Kimbell represents an outlier of tax jurisprudence. For an analysis of
the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Kimbell see supra notes 105-06, 111.
185. See Poole, supra note 164, at 447 (predicting that resolving Section
2036(a) conflict will require Supreme Court review).
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VII. IMPACT: THE FUTURE OF FLPs As AN ESTATE-PLANNING
TOOL IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
While the Third Circuit was clear that it would hold FLPs to a high
standard, the court did not foreclose the possibility of using FLPs as a
means of reducing estate taxes.' 8 6 As such, there are a number of lessons
practitioners should take away from the Third Circuit's ruling in Thompson
in order to properly form, maintain and defend an FLP in the future.
18 7
First, the client must retain sufficient funds for personal expenses. 18 8 Sec-
ond, the client must segregate personal assets from those belonging to the
FLP. 189 Last, the partners must establish and document a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for the FLP. 190 The IRS is willing to permit taxpayers to
derive estate-tax benefits from transfers to an FLP when the FLP is formed
and operated as a legitimate business entity. 19 1 Accordingly, The Third
Circuit's analysis indicated that if clients and planners work together to
follow the framework set forth below, an FLP is likely to withstand height-
ened scrutiny. 1
9 2
A. Retain Sufficient Funds for Decedent's Personal Expenses
To avoid application of Section 2036(a) to assets transferred to an
FLP, the client must retain sufficient funds to cover personal expenses.1
9 3
186. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 379 (concluding that bona fide sale exception
requires identifiable components of objective business enterprise). The Third Cir-
cuit did not dispute that tax advantages may be derived as long as members of the
partnership enter into the transaction "for substantial business and other non-tax
reasons." See id. at 383 (quoting Kimbell; 371 F.3d at 267).
187. See Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 755 (discussing family planning
after Thompson); Lewis S. Harrison & Charles F. Newlin, New Golden Rules for Part-
nerships: How to Handle FLPs in the Wake of Thompson and Kimbell, TRS. AND EsTs.,
Oct. 2004, at 20 (devising rules of reason for forming and maintaining FLPs after
Thompson); Howell, supra note 15, at 734 (discussing practical application of hold-
ing in Thompson).
188. For a discussion on the importance of retaining sufficient personal funds
when contributing to an FLP, see infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion on how to properly segregate personal and partnership
assets, see infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
190. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 379 (holding that FLP transfer is bona fide sale
only for adequate consideration with legitimate business purpose). For a discus-
sion on the legitimate business and non-tax benefits of forming an FLP, see supra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
191. Fee Interview, supra note 63 (stating that IRS is willing to allow tax reduc-
tion for decedent's estate if FLP did not exist primarily to provide tax shelter).
192. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 383 (stating that "objective indicia... [of] a
legitimate business" may provide sufficient evidence for bona fide sale under Sec-
tion 2036(a)). It is important to note that the Tax Court appears to have modified
its arm's length requirement following the Third Circuit's ruling in Thompson. See
Akers, supra note 102, at 13-14 (discussing new standard for bona fide sales set
forth by Tax Court in Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 8 (2005)).
193. See Bissonette, supra note 1, at 78 (discussing need to retain sufficient
resources necessary to meet client's basic living needs); see also Harrison & Newlin,
supra note 187, at 33 n.18 ("One test of the sufficiency of assets retained would be
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In Thompson, the decedent retained funds to cover his expenses for three
and a half years, but the decedent's life expectancy after the date of the
transfer was greater than four years.19 4 Because the Third Circuit found
the six-month discrepancy significant, it can be inferred that the Third
Circuit will closely examine the timing of the transfer in future cases.
1 9 5
Therefore, a practitioner should advise the client not to transfer funds to
the FLP without first considering the amount the client will need to main-
tain his or her accustomed lifestyle. 1 96 Determining the appropriate
amount to transfer requires careful planning by a certified public account-
ant or financial planner, but it remains a crucial first step in establishing
that the client intended to relinquish the right to enjoy the transferred
property. 
19 7
B. Asset Segregation
While the FLP is undoubtedly a unique estate planning device, the
Third Circuit was clear that certain business principles must be upheld.' 9 8
Specifically, the court in Thompson emphasized the need to segregate the
client's personal assets from those belonging to the FLP.199 The court was
adamant that commingling funds displays disrespect for the partnership
whether those retained assets would be adequate to support the decedent's
monthly expenses.").
194. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 376 n.14 (providing calculations of funds
needed to sustain decedent over span of expected life). The court explained that
the "[d]ecedent retained assets of $153,000 and had an annual income of $14,000.
These assets were sufficient to cover the decedent's expenses of $57,202 for ap-
proximately three and a half years. That is: $153,000/($57,202-$14,000)= 3.4. De-
cedent had an actuarial life expectancy of 4.1 years at the time of the transfer." Id.
195. See id. at 376 (noting that, despite "some change ensu[ing] in the formal
relationship of decedent to the assets he contributed to the partnership .... [the]
practical effect of these changes during decedent's life was minimal" (quoting Es-
tate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 387 (2002))) (alterations in
original).
196. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 149 (suggesting that FLPs are more
likely to withstand judicial scrutiny if donor retains "adequate assets to cover all
living expenses"); see also Bissonnette, supra note 1, at 78 (discussing need to retain
sufficient resources necessary to meet client's basic living needs); Eyberg & Raasch,
supra note 8, at 755 ("It is clear from [this case] that an FLP creator should not
transfer so much of his or her assets to raise the question whether there is an
implied agreement for the transferor to have access to the assets.").
197. See Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 755 (suggesting that financial plan-
ners should play role in "determining and documenting an individual's cashflow
needs for his or her remaining life expectancy"); see also Howell, supra note 15, at
733-34 (stating that estate planners should document client's retention of personal
assets).
198. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 377 (indicating that Section 2036(a) applied
when treatment of assets "is more consistent with an estate plan than with an in-
vestment in a legitimate business").
199. See id. (concluding that decedent continued to be the primary benefici-
ary of transferred property despite its transfer to FLP). See generally Eyberg &
Raasch, supra note 8 (discussing methods for segregating assets); Harrison & New-
lin, supra note 187 (same); Howell, supra note 15 (same).
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form and indicates that the donor/decedent transferred the assets with
the intention of retaining post-transfer control. 200 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to segregate the client's personal assets from those belonging to the
FLP. 20 1
Further, the donor cannot use the FLP as a personal checkbook.20 2
This limitation not only precludes the donor's direct withdrawal of FLP
funds, but also bars other partners from distributing FLP funds to the do-
nor for personal expenses. 20 3 The use of FLP assets for personal purposes
suggests that the donor/decedent's relationship to the assets "remained
the same before and after the transfer."20 4 Additionally, a practitioner
should advise his or her client that distributions of partnership income
should only occur "after accounting has been made at the partnership
level. "205
As for the accounting aspects of maintaining the FLP, separate books
and records should document the FLP's financial affairs.20 6 Business
transactions should be conducted with FLP funds and any income derived
from FLP assets should be deposited in the FLP's capital account. 20 7 Ad-
ditionally, each partner should establish a separate bank account for the
FLP and pay all FLP expenses from that account.20 8 Following these steps
will provide the FLP with ample evidence of asset segregation for purposes
of Section 2036(a). 20 9
200. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 376 (discussing facts that indicate commingling
of assets and thereby raising inference of retained control over partnership assets).
201. See LEwIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 102-03 (discussing need to re-
spect partnership form through maintaining separate personal and FLP accounts).
202. See id. at 103 (discussing restrictions on donor's use of FLP funds); see
also Top TAX IssuEs, supra note 3, at 149 (arguing that FLP is more likely to with-
stand judicial scrutiny if donor abstains from personally using partnership assets).
203. See Top TAX ISSUES, supra note 3, at 149 (counseling general avoidance of
personal use of funds by donor).
204. LEws & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 103 (quoting Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1997-242, 1505-6 (1997) (discussing probability
that court will find retentions of control if donor's practical relationship to assets
remains unchanged after transfer); see also Thompson, 382 F.3d at 377 (citing
Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971)) (noting that dece-
dent's relationship to assets remained unchanged after transfer).
205. Bissonnette, supra note 1, at 77.
206. See LEwIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 103 (discussing technical aspects
of accounting for FLP).
207. See id. (emphasizing need to separate partnership income by distributing
income in separate FLP account).
208. See id. (stating that: (1) all financial transactions made on behalf of FLP
must use funds from FLP's account; and (2) all receipts by FLP must be deposited
in FLP's account).
209. Cf Thompson, 382 F.3d at 376 (noting that lack of de jure control over
transferred property alone does not defeat inference of implied agreement among
partners for impermissible use of property).
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C. Legitimate Business Purpose/Non-Tax Benefits
A transfer of assets to an FLP will only meet the Thompson criteria for a
bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration if the estate can cite a
business purpose or other non-tax benefit justifying the existence of the
FLP.2 10 The Third Circuit indicated that consolidating family business as-
sets, transferring management of the business to children and protecting
family members from personal liability constituted sufficient business
purposes.2 1 1
Accordingly, it is imperative that the client identifies a legitimate busi-
ness motivation for forming the FLP. 212 Upon formation of an FLP, the
practitioner should document the business purpose in the partnership
agreement.21 3 Other non-tax reasons for forming the FLP should also be
documented in detail. 21 4 Such measures will provide a court with evi-
dence that the decedent formed the FLP for legitimate reasons outside of
receiving an estate-planning benefit.2 15
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that the ruling in Thompson will change the use of
FLPs for estate planning in the Third Circuit.216 The standard is stringent
210. See LEwis & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 101 (explaining need for valid
business purpose and respect for business form); Top TAx Topics, supra note 3, at
144-45 (discussing need for bona fide sale with full and adequate consideration);
see also Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 755 (arguing that "it is imperative that
FLPs operate like real businesses, in substance and in form"); Harrison & Newlin,
supra note 187, at 31 (emphasizing need for substantive non-tax purpose for FLP);
Howell, supra note 15, at 733-34 (stating importance of meeting "fundamental re-
quirements for creation and operation of FLPs").
211. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 380 (citing Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d
257, 259 (5th Cir. 2004)) (providing example of FLP with substantial business
purpose).
212. For a summary of a number of business/estate related motivations for
forming an FLP, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
213. See Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 755 (discussing placement of busi-
ness purpose in partnership agreement). In addition to establishing the non-tax
benefits for forming an FLP, a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) should also doc-
ument the results to demonstrate that the decedent actually benefited from the
FLP. See id. (stating "(a] CPA financial planner should quantify the cost savings
and any other investment strategy benefits received as a result of transferring as-
sets to the FLP").
214. See id. (adding that existing FLPs should also document non-tax benefits
derived from FLP).
215. See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 187, at 33 (arguing that FLPs can meet
Third Circuit standard "if the clients and practitioners are willing to do due dili-
gence beforehand and spend more time on setting up the partnership"). For an
example of an FLP likely to withstand judicial scrutiny, see Bissonnette, supra note
1, at 82-83.
216. See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 187, at 31-32 (noting that planners
should not underestimate Thompson's "rigorous standard" for determining legiti-
mate non-tax reasons motivating FLP formation for purposes of Section 2036(a));
see also Howell, supra note 15, at 734 (concluding that Thompson demonstrates need
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and will likely result in a decrease in the number of taxpayers choosing to
establish an FLP as a means of estate planning.2 17 Nevertheless, for clients
with dual business and estate planning goals, the use of an FLP remains a
viable means of reducing the burden of the estate tax. 2 18
Lauren E. Bishow
for estate planners' adherence to fundamental requirements of forming and main-
taining FLP).
217. See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 187, at 33 (noting Thompson requires
that practitioners be more selective when choosing FLP as method of estate plan-
ning). For a detailed discussion on determining whether an FLP meets a particu-
lar client's needs, see LEWIs & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 5 (counseling that FLP is
inappropriate estate plan for every client).
218. See LEWIS & CHOMAKOS, supra note 2, at 1 (maintaining that FLP remains
valuable tool for addressing tax and non-tax objectives despite recent attacks by
IRS); Eyberg & Raasch, supra note 8, at 755 (concluding that "[w]hen properly
structured and administered, FLPs holding appropriate assets and created for the
right reasons ... can provide substantial tax savings").
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